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Abstract
This paper establishes a Kantian duty against screen overexposure. After defin-
ing screen exposure, I adopt a Kantian approach to its morality on the ground that 
Kant’s notion of duties to oneself easily captures wrongdoing in absence of harm or 
wrong to others. Then, I draw specifically on Kant’s ‘duties to oneself as an animal 
being’ to introduce a duty of self-government. This duty is based on the negative 
causal impact of the activities it regulates on a human being’s mental and physical 
powers, and, ultimately, on the moral employment of these powers. After doing so, 
I argue that the duty against screen overexposure is an instance of the duty of self-
government. Finally, I consider some objections.
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Introduction
This paper introduces a Kantian duty against immoderate engagement with 
screen–based technologies (screen overexposure). In the first section, after provid-
ing a family resemblance definition of screen exposure, I advocate adopting a Kan-
tian approach to its morality. In particular, Kant’s notion of duties to oneself can 
capture wrongdoing in absence of harm or wrong to others as essentially a lack of 
self–respect, which affords us a richer moral picture. In the second section, I draw 
specifically on the chapter on ‘duties to oneself as an animal being’ in Kant’s Doc-
trine of Virtue to develop a duty of self–government. This duty is based on the nega-
tive causal impact of certain activities on the human being’s mental and physical 
powers, and ultimately on the moral employment of these powers. Introducing it 
lets us avoid problematic teleological interpretations of Kant’s arguments against 
 * Stefano Lo Re 
 stelore87@gmail.com
1 Centre for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK
2 Academia Kantiana, Institute for the Humanities, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, 
Kaliningrad, Russia
 S. Lo Re 
1 3
the vices of drunkenness, gluttony, and lust. It also provides a single rationale for 
the duties against all three, which is elegant. Moreover, this rationale can serve as a 
basis to establish new duties—importantly for my purpose, the duty against screen 
overexposure. After some methodological remarks on the empirical component of 
the negative causal impact argument, in the third section I sketch the contours of 
Kantian self–government. A notable upshot of this account is the permissibility of 
occasional overindulgence. In the last section, I consider objections concerning the 
extensional adequacy of my account, its Kantian credentials, the introduction of the 
duty against screen overexposure, and the independent support for adopting a Kan-
tian approach.
Screen Overexposure and Moral Philosophy
Screen Exposure
In recent years, there has been a renewed scientific interest in the adverse effects 
of the use of technology. The research has focused in particular on the medical and 
psychological repercussions of activities involving new screen–based technological 
devices, often with a special attention given to their impact on children and young 
people. The terms employed in this field are still being established, and so there is 
little terminological uniformity.1 This research is complemented by public discus-
sions on whether such technologies are harmful to the individual or to society at 
large. In fact, public opinion likely anticipated the worries that then became subject 
of scientific investigation.
In this paper, I use screen exposure as an umbrella term for screen–based activi-
ties potentially raising worries of this kind. This term is meant to include a wide 
range of activities (e.g. browsing social media, watching series, playing video 
games) involving various technological devices (e.g. smartphones, computers, vir-
tual reality sets). I group these activities on a family resemblance basis, although 
exposure to a screen strikes me as their most common feature, so that it may be 
1 The following examples suffice as evidence of the scientific interest in the topic, and of the relative 
consensus that at least certain instances of what I call ‘screen exposure’ are harmful (see also the begin-
ning of the next subsection). The vocabulary of addiction has been used in relation to electronic screens 
(Kardaras 2014), the internet (Kuss et al. 2014), and smartphones (Yildiz 2017). A disorder named ‘elec-
tronic screen syndrome’ has been introduced (Dunckley 2017). The impact of ‘screen time’ on well–
being has been assessed (Twenge, Martin, and Campbell 2018). Diagnosis tests for Facebook (Andreas-
sen et  al. 2012), smartphones (Kwon et  al. 2013), and internet addiction (Young 2016) have been put 
forward, and the latter’s association to symptoms of various psychiatric conditions (e.g. ADHD and 
depression) has been investigated (Ko et al. 2012). There is debate over the possible harmful effects of 
digital pornography (see n. 20 below). The WHO has recently recognised the ‘gaming disorder’ (World 
Health Organization 2018; see Pontes et al. 2019), and the APA has deemed it worthy of further study 
(American Psychiatric Association 2013; see Petry et al. 2015). However, note that the DSM includes 
none of the conditions mentioned here; and that the inclusion of ‘non–substance addictions’ is itself con-
troversial (Potenza 2014).
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thought of as a necessary—although by no means sufficient—condition for ‘screen 
exposure’.2 Although the discussion of screen exposure would benefit from further 
analysis, this family resemblance approach is sufficient for my purpose, and ade-
quate to the evolving nature of the phenomenon and to its relative novelty as an 
object of philosophical attention.
Screen Overexposure and Moral Philosophy
There is some consensus in the scientific community and in public opinion that 
screen overexposure is harmful (see n. 1). This harm is thought to extend beyond 
the mere bodily consequences of protracted looking at screens, and rather to include 
cognitive, psychological, and social dimensions. All these provide harm–based rea-
sons against screen overexposure. However, while relevant, such reasons are not 
everything that moral philosophy has to offer. A different, if compatible perspective 
is provided by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, which affords us a richer picture of 
what is wrong with screen overexposure.
This may sound surprising: Kant’s moral philosophy is often thought to be so 
abstract and insensitive to the complexities of real life to be unsuitable to tackle 
new, contemporary problems. However, in recent years this image of Kant, mainly 
based on what in fact are his foundational moral works (e.g. the 1785 Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals), has started to change. This is due to a growing body 
of literature on his Doctrine of Virtue (1797), which, arguably, contains his norma-
tive ethics. Many elements of this work defy the image traditionally associated with 
Kant, from the role of human ends and feelings, to discussions of various kinds of 
social interaction, to the presence of more or less open–ended casuistical questions 
(Trampota et al. 2013, pp. 1–2).3
Kantian Preliminaries
In the next sections, I argue for a Kantian duty against screen overexposure as an 
instance of a more general duty of self–government. Before doing so, I should high-
light the two main features of Kant’s theory that make it an appealing option in 
the context of this project. The first is its distinction between prudence and moral-
ity (GMS 4:414–9; KpV 5:34–9). The former is a conditional kind of normativity 
2 A feature which, however, is not morally salient (see the section ‘Why a duty against screen overexpo-
sure? And why a Kantian duty of self–governance?’ below). Note that some non–screen–based activities 
(e.g. drinking) raise similar concerns to those raised by screen exposure, and some screen–based tech-
nologies are unlikely to do so (e.g. electronic readers).
3 Besides Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (2013), see Timmons (2002), Betzler (2008); and Denis 
(2010), and particularly, Hill (2010). On the relation between Kant’s foundational works and mature sys-
tem, see Timmermann (2007, pp. 169–171) and Wood (2002). Recent Kant–inspired contributions in 
applied ethics address topics such as organ donation (Alpinar–Şencan 2016), and suicide and euthana-
sia (Cholbi 2015). For recent discussions of casuistry and casuistical questions, see Schüssler (2012); 
Schumski (2017).
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concerned with the attainment of happiness. As such, it can only recommend 
courses of action, and do so on account of the end to be attained. Morality is the 
sphere of unconditional commands. As rational beings, we are required to adopt 
principles that conform to the only law that could govern a good will, the Categori-
cal Imperative (GMS 4:421). This is a purely formal law binding solely in virtue of 
being freely self–legislated, without reference to any antecedent end. It is on account 
of this autonomy that human beings have the special dignity of ends in themselves 
(GMS 4:434).
The distinction between prudence and morality makes room for moral considera-
tions beyond those based on harm. A second, less known element of Kant’s philoso-
phy plays an even more important role in my discussion. It is the idea of duties to 
oneself (TL 6:417–447). Kantians distinguish duties to oneself in a thin and a thick 
sense (Timmermann 2013; Atwell 1986, pp. 128–129). The thin, or comprehensive 
sense captures the idea that all moral duties are also duties to oneself insofar as the 
possibility of any obligation rests on the self–binding nature of the human will (TL 
6:417–420).4 The basis of my account of a duty against screen overexposure will be 
the thick, or contrastive sense of duties to oneself—duties which are owed to oneself 
as opposed to being owed to others. This notion is interesting in the present context 
because it makes room for the impermissibility of certain actions and attitudes in 
absence of harm or wrong to others. Indeed, harm and wrong to others are relevant 
to the Kantian moral picture of self–regarding acts. In focusing on duties to oneself, 
however, I choose to draw on what is distinctive about the Kantian framework.
Duties to Oneself and Kantian Duties to Oneself
Duties to oneself arguably are embedded in our pre–theoretical, everyday concep-
tion of morality (Timmermann 2006a, p. 505 and p. 526). Not only does the latter 
include expressions pointing to them (e.g. ‘self–respect’, or ‘owing it to oneself’); 
the wrongness of certain actions or attitudes seems hard to account for without 
appealing to them (e.g. servile behaviour; Timmermann 2006a, 527). Intuitively, 
the wrongness of such actions or attitudes need not involve a prudential failure con-
cerning one’s own best interest; and the basis for the reproach incurred cannot be 
reduced to the harm or wrong to others.5
5 On servility (TL 6:434–437), see Hill (1973). Timmermann introduces five criteria to identify a clear 
substantive duty to oneself: ‘[(i)] that an act or maxim is … good or bad, (ii) that corresponding rules of 
conduct go beyond … prudence, (iii) that such an act or maxim … is not good or bad because others are 
4 The thin sense of duties to oneself is all the more controversial if it is seen as necessarily resting on 
contentious metaphysical claims, notably Kant’s distinction between ‘homo noumenon’ and ‘homo phae-
nomenon’, that is, between the human being ‘as a natural being that has reason’ and ‘as a being endowed 
with inner freedom’ (TL 6:418; see Byrd and Hruschka 2010, Ch. 14). It is by means of this distinction 
that Kant claims to solve the seeming paradox of self–obligation, but it is not exactly clear how this 
is supposed to work. For example, on Jens Timmermann’s reconstruction, homo noumenon’s obligating 
homo phaenomenon also results in an obligation on homo noumenon, which is problematic (Timmer-
mann 2013, p. 217; Samuel Kerstein’s reading is vitiated by a mistaken textual conjecture: compare Ker-
stein 2008, pp. 205–206 with Timmermann 2013, p. 217 n. 26). However, less metaphysically loaded 
Kant–inspired accounts of self–obligation are also available, for example those inspired by Stephen Dar-
wall’s work on the ‘second–personal standpoint’ (Darwall 2006,  2012; see Schaab (2021a, b).
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Despite this, the idea of duties to oneself gets a bad rap in the currently predomi-
nant philosophical conception of morality. Traditionally thought to be a central ele-
ment of morality, duties to oneself suffered a serious blow with the publication of 
Marcus Singer’s famous attack on them (1959). After the short–lived debate which 
immediately followed it,6 ‘duties to oneself have largely disappeared from the radar 
of academic philosophers’ (Cholbi 2015a, p. 852). This subsection provides some 
more defense of duties to oneself, particularly of the Kantian conception of duties to 
oneself.
Within a Kantian framework, violating duties to oneself is essentially a lack of 
self–respect, a failure to treat oneself in a way that is consistent with one’s dig-
nity as a rational, and ultimately as a moral being. This conception of duties to 
oneself is largely immune to the traditional criticisms raised against them.7 The 
first is Singer’s main charge: duties to oneself are incoherent because ‘one could 
release oneself [from them] at will’ (Singer 1959, p. 202). This argument, some 
Kantians respond, begs the question as it simply asserts the non–existence of 
duties to oneself: if there are duties to oneself, one cannot release oneself from 
the obligations they impose (Cholbi 2015a, p. 852; Timmermann 2006a, p. 516).8 
With the same objection in mind, Lara Denis (1997) fleshes out the Kantian con-
ception of moral obligation as a constraint imposed by one’s acknowledgment of 
humanity, in other individuals and in oneself, which makes self–release impos-
sible with regard to duties owed to either. This serves to address a second objec-
tion, namely, that duties to oneself have no place in morality because morality is 
only about other–regarding actions (Baier 1958, cited in Denis 1997). The Kan-
tian account of moral obligation allows us to disambiguate duties to the self from 
duties regarding the self, and is the basis of a conception of morality that refuses 
to assign a privileged status to how we treat others (Denis 1997, pp. 333–334; see 
the subsection ‘Why a duty against screen overexposure? And why a Kantian duty 
6 Kading (1960), Wick (1960, 1961), Mothersill (1961), Knight (1961), and Singer (1963).
7 I should thank an anonymous reviewer at Res Publica for inviting me to provide more context on the 
status of duties to oneself, particularly of Kantian duties to oneself, in the literature. My review of objec-
tions is indebted to Timmermann (2006a) and especially Denis (1997). Both discuss further objections.
8 Recent defenses of duties to oneself focus primarily on Singer’s claim about self–release. For example, 
Daniel Muñoz (2020) argues that while it is possible to release oneself from an obligation, one is under 
that obligation until one effectively does so. In a similar vein, Janis Schaab (2021b) rejects the assump-
tion, implicit in Singer’s argument, that the possibility to release oneself from an obligation entails the 
impossibility of violating that obligation.
affected, and (iv) that it is generally and plausibly classed among things moral. Moreover, any such duty 
must (v) not give the appearance that it has been invented merely to counterbalance the rigour of duties 
to others’ (2006a, p. 527). Unlike the duty to oneself merely as moral being, which is violated by servile 
behaviour, duties to oneself regarded as moral and natural being, the basis of my account, do not seem 
to satisfy (ii). This is not surprising, but it does not mean that the duties reduce to prudential recommen-
dations. The resulting rules of conduct overlap, and compliance with them may well be motivationally 
overdetermined. However, the duties are not grounded in prudential considerations, and should not be 
confused with them.
Footnote 5 (continued)
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of self–governance?’ below). A third, related objection is that duties to oneself 
are just claims of self–interest in disguise (Williams 1985). This simply cannot be 
true of Kantian duties to oneself, since the constraints they impose are not limited 
to cases of imprudence (Denis 1997, p. 333). A final objection is that duties to 
oneself imply state paternalism. Here, Kant’s distinction between legal and ethi-
cal obligation (MS 6:218–221) allows him to separate the question concerning the 
reach of state legislation from that concerning whether an action is bad (Timmer-
mann 2006a, p. 521).
Kantian Resources
A Duty of Self–Government
The main element on which I draw in developing a Kantian duty against screen 
overexposure is the chapter of the Doctrine of Virtue on the perfect duty to one-
self as an animal being (TL 6:421–428).9 Immediately before it, in the general 
introduction to duties to oneself, Kant puts forward two criteria for the classifica-
tion of thick duties to oneself. The first establishes the traditional Kantian distinc-
tion between perfect duties, which are negative and prohibit actions, and imper-
fect duties, which are positive and command the adoption of ends. Kant describes 
the duties to oneself belonging to each category as having to do respectively with 
the ‘moral health (ad esse)’ and the ‘moral prosperity (ad melius esse[)]’ of the 
human being (TL 6:419). The second criterion is whether the human being is con-
sidered ‘both as an animal (natural) being and a moral being or only as a moral 
being’ (TL 6:420).
In discussing the perfect duty to oneself as (for brevity’s sake) an animal being, 
Kant focuses on the corresponding vices, since the duty is negative (i.e. of omis-
sion). Although, strictly speaking, the duty is ‘to preserve [oneself] in [one’s] animal 
nature’ (TL 6:421), we may speak of a plurality of duties opposed to the vices.10 The 
contrary of the duty, Kant writes, is:
9 In doing so, I rely extensively on Mark Timmons’s reading of it (2013), as I find it particularly suitable 
as a basis for a Kantian duty against screen overexposure. However, such a reading is not uncontrover-
sial, and other options are available on, for example, Kant’s account of human nature and of sexuality 
(see Cohen 2006; 2008b; Frierson 2013; Louden 2011; Varden 2020). I cannot explore the connections 
between the perfect duty to oneself as an animal being and other relevant elements in Kant’s theory: for 
example, the Groundwork’s duty to develop one’s talents (GMS 4:422–423; 4:430), which the Doctrine 
of Virtue subsumes under the obligatory end of one’s own perfection; or the indirect duty ‘to secure one’s 
own happiness’ (GMS 4:399, emphasis added). The claims that moderation in eating or drinking pre-
serves the capacity to enjoy foods and drinks (which Kant makes) and that moderation in sexual activity 
preserves the capacity to enjoy sexual activity (which he does not) could come together in an argument 
for acting so as to preserve one’s capacity to enjoy life, falling under the indirect duty to secure one’s 
own happiness (see the next subsection, and also n. 28 below).
10 Kant employs the same ‘negative’ strategy when discussing the duty to oneself merely as moral being 
(TL 6:428–436). See Bacin (2013, p. 245).
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willful physical death … which can be thought as either total, suicide (sui-
cidium), or only partial, mutilating oneself. Mutilating oneself can in turn be 
either material, depriving oneself of certain integral, organic parts, that is, 
maiming oneself, or formal, depriving oneself (permanently or temporarily) 
of one’s capacity for the natural (and so indirectly for the moral) use of one’s 
powers. (TL 6:421)
In the remainder of the paper, I set aside Kant’s discussion of suicide and self–maim-
ing in the first of the three articles of the chapter, and focus on his account of what, 
on the basis of this classification, should be called ‘formal self–mutilation’. This is 
developed through the second and the third article: ‘On defiling oneself by lust’ (TL 
6:424–426), and ‘On stupefying oneself by the excessive use of food and drink’ (TL 
6:427–428).11
With this restriction in place, the duty to oneself as an animal being can be 
characterized as a duty to govern oneself so that one’s bodily and mental pow-
ers can be put to moral use (Timmons 2013, p. 224; Atwell 1986, p. 132; Gregor 
1963, p. 144). In the Doctrine of Virtue, the latter amounts not only to respecting 
other perfect duties, but also to pursuing the obligatory ends of the happiness of 
others and of one’s own perfection (TL 6:382–388; 6:391–394). Indeed, the tax-
onomy of duties to oneself is completed by the imperfect duties commanding the 
pursuit of one’s own ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ perfection (TL 6:444–447). The per-
fect duty to oneself as an animal being can thus be seen as setting limits on what 
one may do to oneself qua natural being in view of such positive expansions: 
the negative duties are ‘the first, though not the principal’ (TL 6:421, emphases 
altered).12
The alternative to the interpretation above is to read Kant as making a moral 
argument on the basis of natural teleology. According to this argument, it is imper-
missible to act contrary to the (alleged) natural purposes of our powers: only the 
natural—as opposed to ‘contra–natural’—use of our powers is permissible. Kant’s 
ambiguity between the two lines of argument persists in the second and third articles 
of the chapter on the duty to oneself as an animal being. Considering these is neces-
sary to characterize the duty against screen overexposure as an instance of the duty 
of self–government.13
13 This duty is likely related to two other notions: ‘moral apathy’ (TL 6:408), as the duty not to be gov-
erned by feelings and inclinations, and ‘autocracy [Autocratie]’ (TL 6:383) as moral self–government 
more generally (but cf. Kant’s use at V–Mo/Collins 27:378; see also the end of the subsection ‘Lust’ 
below). Developing the connections goes beyond the scope of this paper. See Formosa (2011); Baxley 
(2010).
11 Note the contrived parallel in the last indented quote between total and partial physical death on the 
one hand, and permanent and temporary loss of one’s capacities on the other hand. When it comes to 
formal self–mutilation, Kant distinguishes neither temporary loss and permanent loss of capacities due to 
one–off actions, nor these from the cumulative adverse effects of certain habits.
12 Kant says so only with regard to the duty to oneself as animal and moral being, but it is plausible to 
extend this principle to the duty to oneself only as moral being. Timmons suggests that the principal 
duty to oneself as animal and moral being is the imperfect, positive one to cultivate one’s natural powers 
(2013, p. 225). If both claims are correct, then the principal duty to oneself as moral being only would be 
the imperfect, positive one to increase one’s moral perfection.
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Drunkenness and Gluttony
For ease of exposition, I follow Mark Timmons (2013) in considering the two arti-
cles of the chapter in reverse order, beginning with Article III. This pairs together 
drunkenness and gluttony:14
Brutish excess in the use of food and drink is misuse of the means of nourish-
ment that restricts or exhausts our capacity to use them intelligently. Drunken-
ness and gluttony are the vices that come under this heading. A human being 
who is drunk is like a mere animal, not to be treated as a human being. When 
stuffed with food he is in a condition in which he is incapacitated, for a time, 
for actions that would require him to use his powers with skill and delibera-
tion.—It is obvious that putting oneself in such a state violates a duty to one-
self. (TL 6:427)
The beginning of the passage is difficult to read. Charitably, Kant argues that 
immoderation in eating or drinking affects negatively the capacity to eat or drink 
sensibly. One problem is that he actually mentions only food (‘Nahrung’): Mary 
Gregor’s translation adds ‘drink’ because both drunkenness and gluttony are listed 
two lines below. In fact, the beginning of the passage, if we took the original text 
at face value, would be an odd way to begin a paragraph dedicated to both vices. 
Moreover, it is plausible to extend Kant’s reasoning to drinking. If, as he seems to 
argue, occasional overeating can be conducive to the establishment of unhealthy eat-
ing habits, which excludes eating for nourishment but also taking pleasure in eat-
ing, something similar may be said for overdrinking’s impact on taste in drinks and 
social drinking.15
Regardless of whether this is a plausible reconstruction of the initial claim in the 
last indented quotation, I concur with Timmons (2013, p. 235) that the latter’s main 
argument concerns the hindrance of the human being’s ‘powers’ more generally, 
mentioned immediately before the dash. That quotation is not, however, the only 
place where Kant is ambiguous about what is negatively affected by indulging in 
the two vices. Presenting the second criterion for the division of duties to oneself, in 
the general introduction to duties to oneself, he classifies the duties to oneself as an 
animal being on the basis of:
14 Although it has a more general focus on self–stupefaction, as is clear in the original text (‘Von der 
Selbstbetäubung durch Unmäßigkeit im Gebrauch der Genieß– oder auch Nahrungsmittel’). Kant also 
mentions ‘opium and other vegetable products’ (TL 6:427). I follow Mary Gregor’s translation, which, 
however, is not always accurate. I would like to thank Jens Timmermann for drawing my attention to 
the German text here, and for letting me consult a forthcoming version of Gregor’s translation of the 
Tugendlehre revised by him and Jeanine Grenberg.
15 Kant approaches the latter with indulgence at the end of the article, leaving open whether we can jus-
tify ‘a use of wine bordering on intoxication, since it enlivens the company’s conversation’, and to what 
extent one may permissibly accept invitations at dinner parties, given that they are ‘invitations to intem-
perance’ (TL 6:428). On dinner parties as a Kantian reconciliation of our dual nature, see Cohen (2008a). 
It is unclear whether the last indented passage takes the activities (or their adverse effects) to extend (or 
cumulate) over time, or whether it considers them in isolation, as one–off instances. See n. 11 above.
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impulses of nature having to do with man’s animality. Through them nature 
aims at (a) his self–preservation, (b) the preservation of the species, and (c) 
the preservation of his capacity to enjoy life, though still on the animal level 
only.—The vices that are here opposed to his duty to himself are murdering 
himself, the unnatural use of his sexual inclination, and such excessive con-
sumption of food and drink as weakens his capacity for making purposive use 
of his powers. (TL 6:420, emphases altered)
Here, drunkenness and gluttony are said to be wrong both because they are contrary 
to the preservation of the capacity to enjoy life, and because they weaken the human 
being’s bodily and mental powers.
The last two indented passages thus seem to point to different arguments against 
the vices of drunkenness and gluttony.16 One involves the capacity to enjoy life, 
the other the human being’s powers generally. Strictly speaking, both mention the 
adverse effects of drunkenness and gluttony. However, insofar as the former also 
appeals to natural teleology (at least in the last indented quotation), I reserve the 
name negative causal impact argument only for the latter.17 Before moving on, 
I should note that although the question is legitimate, why one ought to preserve 
one’s powers in general, this does not make the latter argument teleological. The 
only answer Kant can give is that they must be protected in view of their moral 
employment—an answer which need not refer to natural ends. Any request for fur-
ther grounds is blocked, as Kant never engages with radical moral skepticism (Tim-
mermann 2007, p. 129; Wood 2007, p. 51 n. 8).
Lust
The second article of the chapter on duties to oneself as an animal being focuses on 
lust. I briefly consider it only to set its argument aside, in favor of the one suggested 
in Kant’s On Pedagogy. Doing so will let me subsume the duties against the three 
vices (drunkenness, gluttony, and lust) under a single, general duty of self–govern-
ment. Thanks to its rationale, the latter can be extended to other activities intuitively 
calling for self–government—notably for my purpose, screen exposure.
For Kant, wrongful sexual activities include those ‘secundum naturam’, ‘in 
accordance with nature’ (compatible with procreation, the natural end of the use of 
sexual organs), like prostitution, adultery, and sexual intercourse between individu-
als not married to each other. However, in article II he seems to focus only on what 
he considers wrongful sexual activities ‘contra naturam’, ‘contrary to nature’, such 
as masturbation and homosexuality (Timmons 2013, pp. 237–238; see V–Mo/Col-
lins 27:390–392).18 In this article, he runs a problematic teleological argument that 
16 Timmons’s failure to highlight the first rationale leads him to read ‘powers’ at the end of the last pas-
sage back into ‘them’ at its beginning (2013, p. 235), which is incorrect.
17 The expression is indebted to Timmons (2013, p. 234).
18 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kant does not consider female masturbation and homosexuality. The case of 
bestiality introduces further complications. Particularly, the negative causal impact argument by itself 
cannot easily rule out single tokens of a given act–type, an intuitive desideratum in this case. This prob-
lem might be addressed by means of other Kantian resources, but I do not do so here.
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fails to meet the burden of explaining why the actions considered are wrong in virtue 
of being non–procreative (Timmons 2013, pp. 237–241). However, in On Pedagogy 
Kant mixes teleological claims with remarks on the adverse effects of masturbation 
on the human being’s powers:
Nothing weakens the mind as well as the body of the human being more than 
the kind of lust which is directed towards oneself, and it is entirely contrary to 
the nature of the human being … [The young man must be told that] through it 
the bodily powers are ruined the most, that it brings on premature old age and 
that his mind will suffer a great deal in the process, and so forth. (Päd 9:497)
Scientific authorities of Kant’s time held masturbation to have harmful effects with 
regard to the ability to reproduce, but also with regard to one’s bodily and mental 
powers more generally (Kerstein 2008, pp. 212–215). This view was probably quite 
common in the public opinion of his time too (Timmons 2013, p. 241). This makes 
room for a Kantian causal argument against practices such as masturbation (Tim-
mons 2013, p. 241), which is important for two reasons.
The first reason is that distinguishing the teleological and the causal argument 
lets us separate the bad Kant from the good (or at least not–clearly–as–bad) Kant. 
We can, in other words, decouple Kant’s rejection of homosexuality, based on the 
former, from a more nuanced account of the morality of masturbation based on 
non–teleological premises. The second reason is that, in so doing, we can bring 
the duties against lust, drunkenness, and gluttony under the same heading: namely, 
self–government.19 Kant himself reportedly employs the vocabulary of self–govern-
ment in characterising all three vices in lectures from around 1775 (V–Mo/Collins 
27:379). Moreover, a student’s notes on his lectures from 1793–94 contain the fol-
lowing moral rationale for self–government: ‘constant vigilance [Aufsicht]’ of one’s 
intellectual side over one’s sensuous side is required ‘in regard to all … inclinations, 
so that in good or ill fortune [one] knows how to determine [oneself] on principle in 
all moral situations’ (V–MS/Vigilantius 27:663).
On the Empirical Premise of the Negative Causal Impact Argument
The previous subsections developed a unitary account of Kant’s duties against 
drunkenness, gluttony, and lust. Excessive engagement in the activities they regu-
late violates a duty of self–government grounded on the negative causal impact of 
the excess on the human being’s mental and bodily powers, which ultimately affects 
the human being’s capacity for morality. This account provides a sufficient basis 
to address the morality of screen exposure in the same terms. Before doing so, a 
methodological point is in order. The causal argument leaves it open whether nega-
tive effects on the human being’s mental and bodily powers result from engaging 
in certain activities per se, or from engaging in them to a certain degree, or in a 
19 Assuming, that is, that the main argument against gluttony and drunkenness is the more convincing 
one concerning ‘powers’ generally (see the previous subsection). Timmons speaks of ‘self–government’ 
and ‘self–governance’ (2013, p. 224).
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specific way or context, and so on. The data to substantiate this empirical premise 
in the argument is provisionally provided by common sense, and conclusively by 
scientific research. For example, the folk belief that overdrinking is harmful need 
not be backed up by sophisticated scientific explanations in order to be adequate in 
the context of this moral argument; and, for most other activities, including sexual 
ones such as masturbation, we can think of a limit after which they degenerate into 
a sort of behavioural addiction, or simply have adverse effects. Scientific research 
can corroborate or contradict the data of common sense, providing more solid and 
fine–grained explanations. Arguably, its role is especially important with regard to 
novel phenomena such as screen exposure. But the general point is that the empirical 
claims substantiating the negative causal impact argument are not, strictly speaking, 
the remit of philosophy. So, Timmons’s claim that Kant’s causal argument against 
masturbation is weaker than the one against drunkenness and gluttony because the 
former ‘relies on extremely dubious if not outright false claims’ (2013, p. 242) based 
on the science of Kant’s time may be defeated by new scientific evidence.20
To sum up this section: after interpreting the duties against drunkenness and glut-
tony as based on the negative causal impact argument, I extended the latter to sexual 
activities such as masturbation, and suggested that the task of filling in the empirical 
premise of the argument ultimately be left to scientific research. The general duty of 
self–government thus introduced provides the framework to address the morality of 
screen exposure. The case for a duty against screen overexposure takes the negative 
causal impact argument, and plugs in it the plausible claim (empirically defeasible 
and susceptible to refinement) that screen overexposure has some adverse effects on 
the human being’s bodily and mental powers. In the next sections, I outline the duty 
against screen overexposure as an instance of the duty of self–government, and then 
consider some objections.21
20 This is mainly a methodological point, but there is debate on the possible adverse effects of mastur-
bation (typically, in association with screen–based pornography). Most recently, see de Alarcon et  al. 
(2019),  Kohut et al. (2019).
21 A recent paper by Timothy Aylsworth and Clinton Castro (2021) is similar in motivation and objec-
tive to the present project, so it will be helpful to clarify the main differences between the two. The first 
is that Aylsworth and Castro argue for an imperfect duty to oneself to embrace ‘digital minimalism’ (i.e. 
to be intentional about one’s use of technology; 2021, pp. 1–2), whereas I argue for a perfect duty of 
self–government owed to the self, of which the duty against screen overexposure is an instance (on the 
perfect nature of the duty of self-government, see the second objection in the subsection ‘Compatibility 
with Kant’s theory’ below). The second is that Aylsworth and Castro focus on smartphone use, which 
they see as ‘unique’, possibly as a result of their emphasis on the repercussions of unchecked technology 
use on our cognitive capacities (2021, p. 3; but cf. 2021, n. 14 and n. 21). Instead, my account leaves 
open the definition of screen exposure, which it inscribes into a general discussion of self–governance, 
and takes into consideration also the non–cognitive repercussions of screen overexposure. The third dif-
ference is that Aylsworth and Castro are less concerned with justifying the Kantian credentials of their 
account. An example of this is their use of the notion of autonomy—in their view, that which the duty 
to be digital minimalists protects. For one thing, autonomy is never mentioned in Kant’s own discus-
sion of duties to oneself (in fact, it has even been argued that it is absent in the Metaphysics of Morals 
as a whole; Kleingeld 2018, p. 61). More substantially, Aylsworth and Castro merge a conception of 
autonomy as ‘personal autonomy’, (non–Kantian) ‘self–governance’ (2021, p. 3; on Kantian self–gov-
ernment cf. the end of the previous subsection), with a more Kantian, but still non–moral conception 
of autonomy, meaning ‘rational agency’, a ‘capacity to set and pursue our chosen ends’ (2021, pp. 3–4). 
Now, although the latter reading is not entirely textually unsupported (on it, cf. Timmermann 2006b), it 
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The Kantian Duty Against Screen Overexposure
The Contours of Self–Government
Determining precisely which screen–based activities (or what degree, context, 
modality of engagement, etc.) are harmful is not a philosophical task. However, 
common sense and a growing scientific literature allow the philosopher to legiti-
mately claim that some forms of screen exposure must be harmful, that is, that there 
is such a thing as screen overexposure. On this basis, some moral guidelines can be 
modeled, starting from the general idea of self–government. What follows focuses 
mainly on frequency and degree (or quantity) in drinking, eating, masturbating, and, 
finally, screen exposure.
Firstly, a Kantian duty of self–government excludes ‘habitual brutish excess’ 
(Timmons 2013, p. 235). Habitual excessive drinking straightforwardly leads to the 
kind of negative effects targeted by the negative causal impact argument. I believe 
the same can be said for habitual overeating, excessive masturbation, and excessive 
screen exposure—although it may be hard to draw the exact lines, there must be a 
threshold beyond which negative effects occur. Secondly, at the other extreme we 
have mere occasional and non–excessive engagement in these activities. This, on the 
present account, is permissible not only in the obvious case of eating, but also with 
regard to occasional and moderate drinking, masturbation, and screen exposure.22
Things are more complicated with regard to ‘occasional overindulgence’ (Tim-
mons 2013, p. 235, emphasis removed). Timmons lists a few reasons why this 
may be morally problematic, but rightly notes that much depends on the details 
of risk–assessment (2013, p. 236). One commonsensical reason he puts forward is 
that occasional overindulgence may turn into habitual overindulgence, and lead to 
reduced self–government in general; a more specifically Kantian one is that by tem-
porarily impairing certain capacities one may make oneself unable to fulfill positive 
obligations. Timmons also notes that intuitively morally unobjectionable activities 
such as thrill rides would be ruled out as impermissible if giving up full control 
over one’s capacities for the sake of pleasure were a sufficient condition in this con-
text (2013, p. 236). Ultimately, fulfilling one’s positive obligations involves finding 
a moral balance, which, arguably, must also take into account the indirect duty to 
secure one’s own happiness (see n. 9 above). More problematic for the permissi-
bility of occasional overindulgence is the possibility that it might lead to violating 
Footnote 21 (continued)
is unclear whether autonomy so construed can play the role that Aylsworth and Castro assign to it (but cf. 
their hint at ‘the proper exercise of our autonomy’, identified with the Kantian good will; 2021, p. 9). My 
argument refers more directly and less ambiguously to the moral use of our capacities. I should like to 
thank an anonymous reviewer at Res Publica for drawing my attention to Aylsworth and Castro’s paper.
22 I use ‘drinking’ for ‘drinking alcoholic beverages’ (although the argument extends to coffee, sugary 
beverages, etc.). With regard to quality and quantity, Kant reportedly says: ‘Drinking to excess does not 
refer to quantity (nobody ever gets a passion for drinking large amounts of water), but to the refinement 
and quality of the beverage; but in eating, a man can be led into excess even by bad food’ (V–Mo/Collins 
27:380).
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strict duties. One of Kant’s examples in his discussion of imputation is that wrong-
ful actions performed while drunk cannot be imputed to one as free deeds, but one 
is still accountable for the choice of getting drunk (V–Mo/Collins 27:288; 27:291; 
V–MS/Vigilantius 27:559; 27:568).
Taking cue from Timmons’s reference to risk-taking, the following case may 
serve to test our intuitions about occasional overindulgence, particularly those of 
worried Kantians:23
Kantian Trip: After a week spent working, volunteering, and practicing the 
piano, Sanga is having a relaxing day with her friends of the Kant Reading 
Group. Among the many planned social activities, some of the friends, includ-
ing Sanga, are going to take a hallucinogenic drug. This drug, legal by the law 
of the land, is expected to impair for some time the cognitive and deliberative 
capacities of those taking it. The group has chosen it specifically because of 
the short duration of its effects (say, around half an hour). The group has taken 
every reasonable precaution to avoid short– and long–term harm to those tak-
ing the drug, the others in the group, and other people; and to prevent viola-
tions of strict duties. After the trip is over, those who took the drug will share 
their experience with the whole group, and then everyone will go back to read-
ing the second Critique under a starry sky.
Sanga regularly fulfills her positive duties. The day involves social activities, and 
the hallucinogenic drug experience too, while per se solitary, is not undertaken in an 
anti–social spirit.24 Risk of harm to the drug users themselves, to the other friends, 
or to other people has been reasonably minimized. Likewise, no violation of strict 
duties is likely to occur. Given all this, it looks to me that the burden is on those who 
would claim that Sanga’s taking the hallucinogenic drug is impermissible. More 
generally, restrictive Kantian arguments against occasional overindulgence are likely 
to be either question–begging in simply stating that occasional overindulgence is 
incompatible with one’s dignity, or questionable insofar as they conceive of certain 
acts as inherently self–degrading on problematic teleological grounds.25
Insofar as the moral considerations at issue in the present paper only are con-
cerned, I believe, this rough model largely tracks commonsensical considerations. 
The upshots concerning screen exposure (which, recall, I purposefully defined in 
broad terms) are that (i) habitual screen overexposure is impermissible and (ii) 
23 Kantian Trip is about a hallucinogenic drug, but a similar case could be constructed about overdrink-
ing.
24 This pre-empts an objection from anti–sociality. While Kant deems gluttony worse than drunkenness 
(as the former ‘does not even arouse imagination to an active play of representations’; TL 6:427), he 
reportedly condemns solitary drinking and drunkenness (putting them at the same level as gluttony; V–
Mo/Collins 27:381; V–MS/Vigilantius 27:633), and explicitly deplores ‘all silent intoxication’, namely 
‘intoxication that does not enliven sociability and the reciprocal communication of thought’ (ApH 
7:170–172; see also TL 6:428).
25 This is different from the argument that certain actions are inherently self–degrading insofar as they 
express something defective about one’s character (Timmons 2013, p. 225 n. 7). There seems to be noth-
ing morally objectionable in, as it were, responsible overindulgence.
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moderate or occasional screen exposure is permissible. It is harder to give a single 
verdict concerning (iii) occasional screen overexposure (say, binge video–gaming 
on occasion), but this is the same for other activities calling for self–government. A 
lot will depend on the specific activity and other factors such as duration, quality of 
engagement (e.g. immersiveness), context, and aim of the activity. However, so long 
as the negative causal impact argument only is concerned, I believe that occasional 
screen overexposure (and occasional overindulgence generally) should not be ruled 
out as impermissible.
The duty against screen overexposure provides a Kantian basis for more 
fine–grained accounts of the morality of engagement with specific screen–based 
technologies. The present account focuses on the morality of screen exposure solely 
from the perspective of a duty to oneself, namely the duty of self–government. As 
such, it aims neither to discuss the considerations that would speak in favor of screen 
exposure in specific circumstances, nor the other ways in which screen exposure or 
overexposure might be morally problematic. However, considering some objections 
will allow me to flesh out my account in a bit more detail.
Objections
Extensional Adequacy
A first set of objections concerns the extensional adequacy of the duty against screen 
overexposure. The first is that on the model outlined in the last subsection the duty 
prohibits, for example, academics from working for long stretches of time on lap-
tops, or physicians from using medical equipment with screens. The objection may 
be accommodated by restricting the scope of the duty to screen use aimed at pleas-
ure or happiness only (compare Timmons’s thrill rides example in the previous sub-
section). This straightforwardly excludes eating and hydrating for sustenance, but 
also activities not immediately aimed at pleasure or happiness. Producing knowl-
edge and providing medical care, while involving some element of gratification, also 
constitute the fulfillment of moral obligations, and so the examples given above are 
excluded from the discussion.
A second objection focuses on screen–based activities that increase one’s rational 
capacities—for example, reading on an electronic reader. This can be addressed by 
noting that merely looking at a screen does not necessarily count as screen expo-
sure. Recall, the family resemblance definition of screen exposure introduced at the 
beginning of the paper was already meant to capture screen–based activities which 
raise worries of the relevant kind. In this sense, it was not neutral to begin with. In 
the electronic reader example, once the worries are detached from the specific tech-
nology, the question becomes whether one can read so much so as to violate a duty 
of self–government. But, especially on a Kantian picture, improving one’s rational 
capacities seems to be permissible almost by definition.
A third objection is that the negative causal impact argument cannot account 
for cases where the pathological engagement in a certain activity or the use of cer-
tain substances coexists well with one’s capacities. An example is the variety of 
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‘high–functioning’ –isms (e.g. alcoholism). A commonsensical, empirical reply 
may be that the abuse eventually catches up. More importantly perhaps, what mat-
ters ultimately is not one’s mental or bodily powers in themselves, but rather their 
moral use. The negative causal impact argument does not protect human mental (or 
physical) capacities because they have value in isolation: it protects them in view of 
their being put to good use. This cannot be limited to ‘functioning’ well in a profes-
sional or social context, but is a more encompassing, and, as it were, holistic notion, 
captured by Kant’s reference to perfection (particularly, moral perfection).26 This 
somewhat indirect response also serves to address a related objection which focuses 
on the use of substances aimed at improving one’s rational capacities (cognitive 
enhancers). This objection goes further than mere coexistence with said capacities 
(granted, for the sake of argument, in cases of ‘high–functioning’). Rather, it mir-
rors the second one above, concerning screen–based activities that increase them. 
Together, the two raise the interesting question whether Kant’s theory should set 
limits on the improvement of rational capacities, which I cannot take up here.27
Compatibility with Kant’s Theory
Another set of objections concerns the compatibility of my account with Kant’s sys-
tem of duties. The first is that my duty of self–government alters Kant’s account of 
the duty to oneself as an animal being (on what follows, see the section ‘Kantian 
resources’ above). I grant this point so far as it focuses on his schematic and teleol-
ogy–driven derivation of the three articles on the basis of the human being’s alleged 
animal impulses. However, my account is compatible with Kant’s general classifica-
tion of duties to oneself. The duties falling under self–government are still negative. 
Moreover, my account is also compatible with the different classification of duties 
to oneself as animal being specifically, given at the beginning of the corresponding 
section of the Doctrine of Virtue, where Kant distinguishes murdering and maim-
ing oneself from formal self–mutilation. These classifications are equally plausible, 
particularly in virtue of what the latter entails about the article on lust. There are 
overwhelming independent reasons to endorse a non–teleological and more empiri-
cally–informed account of the morality of sexual activities. By doing so, to summa-
rize, our classification comes to include a duty against murdering and maiming one-
self, and a general duty of self–government, which regulates activities potentially 
harmful to human capacities.
The second objection is that the duty of self–government looks too much like 
an imperfect duty, in conflict with the title of the chapter on which it is based. This 
is not the case. Its characterization as a duty of omission largely depends on the 
description of what it prohibits. It is also true that it does look as an imperfect duty 
insofar as it regards maxims as policies involving a certain flexibility (what Kant 
26 However, on the present account, screen exposure is morally problematic if it interferes with one’s 
profession, or causes social withdrawal.
27 See Bauer (2018). A similar discussion could be had about pathological engagement in activities nor-
mally aimed at enhancing one’s physical powers.
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calls ‘latitude’; TL 6:390) over time. Still, the duty exercises a negative limitation: 
it does not prescribe the adoption of ends. Self–government falls under what Kant 
calls ‘moral health’, and so it is a mere precondition for the pursuit of one’s perfec-
tion and of the happiness of others (see the subsection ‘A duty of self–government’ 
above).28 Admittedly, much potentially hinges also on the plausibility of my case for 
the permissibility of occasional overindulgence (see the discussion of Kantian Trip 
above), since the latter arguably is a good candidate for a one–off action that one 
would expect a perfect duty to forbid.29
Why a Duty Against Screen Overexposure? and Why a Kantian Duty of Self–
Governance?
Finally, two objections cast doubt in different ways on the project’s motivation and 
significance.30 The first is that screen overexposure is not sufficiently distinct from 
other activities with a similar negative causal impact to justify the introduction of a 
specific duty against it. Unless there is something distinctive about screen overex-
posure, the objection goes, introducing a duty against it is a philosophically unin-
teresting rehashing of Kant’s argumentative strategy. If we can apply the latter with 
unsurprising results to many activities to which Kant himself either did not or could 
not apply it, what is the added value of focusing on screen exposure?
While I do think that there is something special about screen exposure, I doubt 
that a single feature of it could justify a duty specifically against screen overexpo-
sure. None of the morally salient features of screen exposure strikes me as unique 
28 In his discussion of drunkenness and gluttony, Kant writes: ‘Here the reason for considering this kind 
of excess a vice is not the harm … that a human being brings on himself by it; for then the principle by 
which it is to be counteracted would be one of [happiness] and such a principle can establish only a rule 
of prudence, never a duty—at least not a direct duty’ (TL 6:427, emphasis added). This seems to imply 
that Kant intends to establish a direct duty. Another objection concerning the Kantian credentials of my 
account, then, is that the duty of self–government, instead, looks like an indirect duty. The latter consists 
in, roughly, a permissible course of action aimed at the preservation of one’s well–being, which can be 
indirectly commanded insofar as preserving some level of well–being is a safeguard against immorality 
(see n. 9 above). Firstly, regardless of Kant’s own intentions, the quotation just given does not exclude 
the possibility of understanding the duty (also) as an indirect duty. Secondly, Kant’s pointing to a more 
robustly moral version of the duty may be due to the teleological nature of the argument. Thirdly, unlike 
Kant’s own examples of indirect duties, the duty of self–government remains negative. Finally, Kantians 
have questioned the moral status of indirect duties, which at the very least does not seem to constitute a 
category of duties in their own right, alongside, for example, perfect and imperfect duties (Timmermann 
2007, p. 36). The following options are available to Kantians: (i) give up duties to oneself as an animal 
being entirely, and bring the concerns they capture entirely under the sphere of prudence; (ii) accept a 
teleological reading of such duties to read them unambiguously as direct duties; (iii) give up the category 
of indirect duties altogether; (iv) interpret duties to oneself as an animal being as (also) indirect duties. I 
listed these options from least to most preferable, and for the time being I endorse (iv).
29 Which it still need not forbid under all circumstances (see Timmons 2013, p. 223). The modalities of 
permissible indulgence will be a function of many factors, including absence of conflict with strict duties 
and harmonization with wide duties. Ultimately, like compliance with all duties, compliance with the 
duty of self–government requires practical judgment.
30 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer at Res Publica for raising both.
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to it.31 Just to make some examples: like alcohol consumption, screen exposure 
is widely socially accepted; like the use of some psychoactive drugs, its negative 
effects can be subtle and may take a long time to manifest themselves fully; like 
sexual activity, it is neither necessarily social nor necessarily asocial. However, I 
believe it is the particular combination of features characterizing screen exposure 
that makes screen overexposure a problem worth considering in its own right, 
beyond the general duty of self–government.
This response is based on a hunch. But this is consistent with the reason why I 
did not try to provide an exhaustive definition of screen exposure. This phenomenon 
is still unfolding before our eyes, and we do not yet fully grasp its ramifications, 
its causal impact on us, and its moral significance. I think all are likely to be huge 
(no technological dystopianism intended). This does not exclude that, in the future, 
screen overexposure (or some specific instance of it) will be seen as a textbook 
example of lack of self–government. For the time being, however, it is important to 
put the spotlight on it.
Furthermore, a Kantian duty against screen overexposure plays an important 
role for Kantian moral philosophy. If duties to oneself are part of morality, Kan-
tians arguably should ‘cast aside those of Kant’s examples that command little or no 
assent today, and look for new paradigm cases of duties to the self’ (Timmermann 
2006a, p. 521). In this respect, a duty against screen overexposure may succeed 
where a general duty of self–government may not. From a Kantian perspective, then, 
the former makes even more sense.
This brings me to the second objection, namely that more justification is needed 
to take a Kantian approach to the morality of screen exposure, and self–government 
more generally: are there independently plausible reasons to do so?
Firstly, most of us spend too much time in front of screens while perceiving that 
there is something wrong with it. I think that the intuition that this wrongness cannot 
be reduced to the impact of screen overexposure on one’s well–being or to its indi-
rect effects on others is not theory–laden. Kant’s theory, particularly his duties to the 
self, is highly suitable to account for this intuition.
This, secondly, might even lead non–Kantians to wonder whether Kant is right 
in seeing the self/others distinction as to some extent a moral red herring. The rel-
evant distinction, for Kant, is between reason and inclinations: morality is not about 
‘the supremacy of (allegedly good) other–regarding reasons over (supposedly bad) 
self–regarding ones, but rather the priority of rational, universal, timeless princi-
ples of action over the questionable claims of the non–rational elements of human 
nature’ (Timmermann 2006a, p. 525).
Finally, and relatedly, approaching issues of self–government via Kantian duties 
to oneself can be appealing on broadly egalitarian grounds. Within a Kantian 
31 A possible exception might be the pervasiveness of screen exposure (there seems to be no way to 
live in an information society without engaging in it), but even this property is arguably not unique to it 
(think about, for example, food consumption). Although identifying a single feature of screen exposure 
that distinguishes it from other activities intuitively requiring some degree of self–government would 
strengthen my response to the objection under consideration, the response in the main text is, I believe, 
sufficient.
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conception of morality, one must respect humanity in others and in oneself (see the 
subsection ‘Duties to Oneself and Kantian Duties to Oneself’ above). Reason forces 
agents to recognize their own dignity, which is ultimately based on their capacity 
for moral action and which exacts respect from others and from oneself. From this 
perspective, Kantian duties to oneself express a requirement of impartiality in not 
excluding oneself from the scope of morality (Denis 1997, p. 343).
Conclusion
This paper offered a technologically updated plea for the traditional idea of modera-
tion. It is to be expected that the definition and the morality of screen exposure will 
be explored in further detail in the future. It is also likely that more fine–grained and 
differentiated assessments of the morality of engagement with specific screen–based 
technologies will be put forward. By subsuming the morality of screen exposure 
under the more general heading of self–government, this paper provided a Kantian 
framework for this further research.
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